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Introduction 
The debate around ethical consumption is often characterised by discussion of its numerous 
failures (Littler, 2011). Indeed, some have suggested that the ethical consumer is a ‘myth’, as 
consumer decision-making is entirely context-specific and based on complex individual trade-
offs (Devinney et al., 2010). In response, and drawing on evidence from an empirical study, 
this paper advances a pragmatist understanding of consumption ethics as practice as a 
response to the many debates which characterise the field. In doing so, it draws on the central 
roles of values and value in consumption and pluralist philosophical thought, and proposes a 
critique of the ethical consumer as ‘rational maximiser’. In doing so the study aims to bridge 
the gap between much of the post-structuralist thought evident in emerging studies of ethical 
consumption (see for example Bartels and Onwezen, 2014; Giesler and Veresiu, 2014; 
Cherrier, 2007; Cherrier and Murray , 2007) and the ‘techno-rational’ discourse of individual 
trade-offs to understand the role of moral evaluation in clothing consumption practices.  
 
This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, as Rorty (1999) notes, consensus is required about 
the best ways to promote development and reduce suffering which does not reduce ethical 
debates to arguments around uncertainty. Secondly, few studies have sought to explore the 
theoretical implications of morality as it relates to consumption (Caruana, 2007), and that this 
is a requirement if consumer research is to develop in sophistication. As Connolly and Shaw 
(2006) conclude that there is a great deal of diversity in consumer views and behaviour, and 
that organisations rarely understand these opinions. Here a case for linking a postmodern, 
pluralist and pragmatist conception of morality is proposed, which rejects opposing absolutist 
and relativist moral philosophies.  
 
Indeed, in a (consumer) culture in which ethical consumption is both a part and a consequence 
(Newholm and Shaw, 2007), consumers are faced with the consequences of their actions, but 
without the benefit of the guidance of traditional values, ‘grand narratives’ or regimes of 
truth’ (Cherrier, 2007; Bauman, 1993).  Here postmodern and poststructual insights provide 
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insight into the context in which consumers find themselves and, as Feldman (1998) notes, 
whilst the postmodern perspective does not necessarily provide answers, recognising plurality 
may offer the ability to understand contrasting points of view, and this discourse and analysis 
may usefully be employed to reach greater clarity on the underlying reasoning behind 
consumer decisions.  
 
Background 
As the above suggests, there remains a discomfort in the field of ethical consumption which is 
manifest in, for example, the attitude-behaviour gap (Johnstone and Tan, 2014; Moraes et al., 
2012; Carrington et al., 2010; Auger and Devinney, 2007) and the proclaimed ‘myth’ of the 
ethical consumer (Devinney et al., 2010, Carrigan and Attalla, 2001). Here, two main areas of 
literature (broadly classified into psychological and sociological perspectives) will be 
considered to attempt to understand how ethical consumer decision making and valuation has 
been approached to gain greater insight into some of the problems and complexities in the 
field. 
 
Value-Belief / Moral Norm Models 
One significant area of literature seeks to understand consumers’ ethical decision-making 
largely from a psychological perspective. These studies tend to fall into one of two broad 
fields; those utilising expectancy-value models, and those utilising ‘moral norm’ or value-
belief models (De Groot and Thøgersen, 2015; Stern, 2000). Expectancy-value models 
consider the costs and benefits of particular (ethical) behaviours (expectancy), and weigh 
them against personal values, with those behaviours resulting in the greatest net benefit or 
utility being chosen on the basis that societal utility is maximised when individual utility is 
maximised, but also based on deontological moral norms about the right thing to do (De 
Groot, Schubert and Thøgersen, 2016). Many studies are characterised by this approach and 
apply the theory of planned behaviour to the study of ethical consumption (see for example, 
Carrington et al., 2010; Shaw et al., 2000, Shaw and Clarke, 1999, Sparks and Shepherd, 
1992). However, these have been argued to reduce ethical decision making to a purely 
cognitive process of arriving at utilitarian outcomes which predominantly serve self-
interested behaviours, are deficient in explaining ethical or moral motivations, are poor 
predictors of likely behaviour and assume consumers have full control (De Groot, Schubert 
and Thøgersen, 2016).  
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In rejecting consumers as rational individual-optimisers, Thøgersen  (1996) argues the case 
for moral norm theory, which focuses on values and which marketers should attempt to 
‘awaken’ in promoting pro-environmental behaviour (De Groot, Schbert and Thøgersen, 
2016). Thus a second set of literature drawing on pyschological perspectives has focused on 
deontologically-based moral norms (Thøgersen , 1996) and value theory. In an 
environmental-behaviour setting, Stern (2000) has termed this value-belief norm theory, 
based on the values-based work of Schwartz (1994) and Rokeach (1973). This recognises that 
there is an inherent link between an individual’s values and both their ethics and their 
behaviour. Indeed, it is widely accepted in the field of consumer behaviour that values 
constitute a central influence which determines consumers’ consumption behaviours 
(Gutman, 1982), through the achievement of higher order states (Baudrillard, 1998) and 
studies in ethical consumption have begun to adopt this perspective (see for example Jägel et 
al., 2012; de Groot and Steg, 2010; Shaw et al., 2005). As Jägel et al. (2012) and Shaw et al. 
(2005) note, values serve as guiding principles and therefore play a significant role in 
determining (ethical) consumption. Jägel et al. (2012) have applied this approach to ethical 
clothing consumption in which they find that value for money and style conflict with ethical 
concerns, also resulting in ‘value trade-offs.’ 
 
However, such approaches have been criticised from a number of perspectives, including 
postmodern critique emphasising fragmentation (identity construction) and decentredness 
(problems with unifying theories in the context of lived experience) (Firat and Venkatesh, 
1995), and the numbers of contrasting identities and roles at play (Brown, 2006). Further, 
Valor (2007), stresses the significance of ambivalence in purchase behaviour, and Devinney 
et al. (2010: 172) argue that the scales on which most values research are based are flawed 
and lack validity because they work on an assumption that context does not ‘interact’ with 
values, and that given values are difficult to change, consumer research focused on behaviour 
change employing ‘traditional’ values research relies on a: “…religious conversion of sorts”; 
values are brought into the purchasing context, but they are one only one of many 
contributors to the consumption decision. 
 
Continental critique and poststructural development: identity and practice 
The ‘techno-rational’ discourses outlined above have further tended to focus on the practice 
of ethical consumption, as opposed to the ontological position of ‘being’ an ethical consumer 
(Shaw and Riach, 2011), or the social processes and meanings that may underpin the notion 
and nature of ethical consumption (Caruana, 2007).  With respect to ontology, Garcia-Ruiz 
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and Lluesma (2014) argue that deontological and consequentialist thinking foster a clear 
distinction, and possibly an antagonism, between ethical and non-ethical consumption and 
cannot account for a more developmental ethics in which, as consumers’ understanding of the 
good life evolves with experience. In line with this approach, consumption is often considered 
as an act of processual identity construction (Cherrier and Murray, 2007), in which cultural 
backgrounds, personal histories and the social context are also critical (Cherrier, 2007). This 
sociological perspective is largely reflected in the canon of work under the ‘consumer culture 
theory’ (CCT) banner (Arnould and Thompson , 2005), and two emergent strands of thought 
have emerged under this perspective (Thompson et al., 2013). The first views consumption as 
a form of identity work (both personal and collective) and the ‘lived world’ of consumers 
(Arnould and Thompson , 2005), the second relates to Caruana’s (2007) classification of 
constructivist perspectives. Here, ethical consumption is viewed as a sociological practice, in 
which there is increased interest for the study of consumption (Halkier et al., 2011; Warde, 
2005).  
 
Consumer identity work has gained significant momentum; Cherrier (2007) observes that 
ethical consumption practices emerge through the ‘interplay’ between individual and 
collective identity and a number of studies of morality in consumption have adopted 
perspectives on identity, both at the level of the individual (see for example Luedicke et al., 
2009; Cherrier, 2006) and in terms of social identity (Bartels and Onwezen, 2014). A number 
of studies have also adopted a ‘consumption practice’ perspective on consumption (Arsel and 
Thompson, 2011; Halkier et al., 2011; Shankar et al., 2009; Warde, 2005) and ethical 
consumption and environmental behaviour change (see for example Garcia-Ruiz and 
Rodriguez-Lluesma, 2014; Hargreaves, 2011; Shaw and Riach, 2011; Røpke, 2009; Connolly 
and Prothero, 2008). Here the relationship between practice and identity is recognised (Arsel 
and Thompson, 2011; Shankar et al., 2009), the latter being validated and reinforced by the 
former within the ‘social world’ of the consumer. Many of these studies employ Bourdieu’s 
(1992) concept of habitus to stress the spontaneous nature of consumption which challenge 
the ‘received wisdom’ around consumer intentions, and which lies between the objective and 
the subjective; it is not produced by ‘mechanical’ and observable stimuli, but neither is it 
based on individual conscious cognitive choices; it is a form of ‘inconspicuous consumption’ 
(Hargreaves, 2011).  
  
Trade-offs 
Whilst each of these approaches and perspectives has its own attractions and pitfalls, a 
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concept that emerges as a central theme and unites these areas of literature around the practice 
of ethical consumption is that of the trade off, in which consumer choice is characterised as 
the weighing up of costs and benefits of ethical behaviour and factoring in personal values, 
with preference given to choices which result in the ‘best’ net utility; this type of utilitarian 
thinking is often evident in justifying inconsistent ethical consumption choices (see for 
example Eckhardt et al., 2010), and they are typically implicitly framed as cognitive, rational 
and largely utilitarian approaches to (moral) decision making. For example, McGoldrick and 
Freestone (2008) note the trade-offs inherent in ethical purchasing in terms of a cost-benefit 
approach, or a ‘conflict’ approach to decision making.  
 
Despite the prevalence of utilitarian approaches, other studies have also adopted the trade-off 
as a central tenet. Valor (2007) and Shaw et al. (2007) note the ‘compromises’ consumers 
have to take in making an ethical stance, and Valor (2007) identifies ambivalence as being a 
key characterisation of ethical consumer behaviour. In the identity perspective, Arnould and 
Thompson (2005), amongst others, also note that identity projects are largely goal-driven, but 
characterised by conflict, internal contradictions and ambivalence. In practice perspectives 
Røpke (2009) notes conflicts between individuals’ core concerns in everyday life, and 
environmental concerns. Similarly, Littler (2011) argues that ethical consumption is 
increasingly becoming what might best be describes as ‘contradictory consumption’ as it 
often involves a number of different practices which are often in conflict with one another. 
Further, in linking identity and practice approaches, Shaw and Riach (2011) note that the 
practice of ethical consumption and the identity of ‘ethical consumer’ may be characterised 
by contradictions, which carries a need to understand the tensions created when values and 
actions may mismatch. Finally, as Devinney et al. (2010) argue, behaviour (and especially 
ethical consumer behaviour, which involves difficult and inconvenient choices) is based upon 
trade-offs of valuation, and they argue that research should examine the inconsistencies 
between attitudes and behaviour and consumer choices.  
 
Despite this persistent rhetoric around the notion of a trade-off, there have been few attempts 
to engage with a meaning of what those trade-offs are and how they are enacted in practice, 
and the analytic device to understand the trade-off has been the subject of little attention. 
Devinney et al. (2010) have perhaps applied the most focus by applying a ‘best-worst’ (BW) 
experiment, but in other studies they are positioned as being negative balances of positive 
outcomes (Moraes et al., 2010; Schröder and McEachren, 2004; Lim et al., 2014; Shaw et al., 
2015). The trade-offs referred to in these studies often imply that the consumer is engaged in 
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an act of preferential judgement; that multiple factors are compared to arrive at a course of 
action which balance the relative importance of both the benefits and sacrifices of engaging in 
an act. This balancing of benefit and sacrifice has been one of the central strands within the 
work on the concept of value (Ng and Smith, 2012; Sanchez et al., 2009). 
 
Negotiating Trade-Offs: Value 
Woodall’s (2003) synthesis of the various forms of value reveals its complexity and 
multidimensionality and provides a more holistic approach to the ‘trade-off’ perspective as 
largely cognitive, utilitarian evaluations of benefits versus sacrifices (Sanchez and Iniesta, 
2007; Heskett et al., 1997), noting that whilst different forms of value can be identified which 
may exist independently, all forms will ‘subordinate’ to an overall view which accounts for 
both benefit and sacrifice across a number of dimensions of values. This concept of ‘Net VC’ 
classifies benefits both in terms of attributes and outcomes, and non-monetary as well as 
monetary sacrifices, and corresponds with much of the work on how customer value is 
realised.  
 
However, there are two issues with this notion of trade-offs. Firstly, as Painter-Morland 
(2011) notes, the rationality employed in such utilitarian models is based on a number of 
spurious principles, including commensurability, aggregation and maximisation. Whilst it is 
likely that issues such as scaling and measurement are likely to be impossible, these 
principles also take no account of the personal and contextual factors that may inform how 
they experience value. Woodall (2003) further notes that the problem with Net VC as an 
evaluative tool is that consumers are unlikely to make such rational (or cognitive) appraisals. 
Indeed, such overall valuation processes are likely to be largely unconscious, and, as 
previously mentioned, the roles of affect and intuition may also be significant. Vargo and 
Lusch (2012) also note that value is contextually specific and contingent on the availability 
and integration of other resources; that is, that value is determined (or perhaps created) 
through integrative practices which are not ‘simple’ cognitive trade-offs, but embedded 
within the structures within which ‘actors’ exist, which themselves are both enabling and 
constraining. Indeed, practice is central to the debate, and it was argued previously that 
changing behaviours can mean changing ingrained and long-standing habits. Ng and Smith 
(2012) argue for a view of value which is characterised by a phenomenological practice of 
value creation for outcomes; that is, it is not ‘perceived’, but performed, with the object 
becoming an inherent element of the individual’s social and cultural practices.  They argue 
that this phenomenological view relates also to ethical and moral dimensions of value as the 
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‘goodness’ of the object is enacted by individuals and their values in their social and cultural 
practices; it is this perspective, therefore, which renders rational, cognitive approaches 
unlikely. Instead, Woodall (2003) suggests that an overall aggregate response may be more 
appropriate in which VC is developed over time through all of the customer’s experiences by 
largely non-rational processes. This intuitive aggregation of factors over time may include 
incompatible values and may correspond with Dewey’s (2008) notion of a unification of 
value that involves thought and synthesis, and which emerges through experience.  
 
However, whilst many studies have examined what is valued by consumers and their values, 
few studies have sought to understand how consumers evaluate value, and this may provide 
insight into the trade-offs it is claimed exist in ethical consumption and it is therefore 
proposed that trade-offs may best be explored utilising a form of aggregated value for the 
customer or personal advantage which recognises the balance of benefits and sacrifices 
(whether they may be cognitive, affective or intuitive), and which may occur at different 
levels of action, practice and experience. However, the phenomenological perspective (and 
particularly for personal experiences) recognises the subjectivity of terms such as ‘benefit’ 
and ‘sacrifice’ and the pluralist view of value and values.  These trade-offs should be 
considered in terms of how consumers enact value in their practices. The term enact as used 
by Ng and Smith (2012) is preferred here as it is an inherent part of the individual’s practices, 
and may include the value the consumer expects to receive ex ante or derives ex post, 
although it is recognised that this level of experience may be largely sub-conscious.  
 
Methodology and Methods 
In response to criticisms levelled against both normative and relativist ethical positions but 
viewing the tolerance and contextuality that relativism affords as desirable, Hinman (2003) 
proposes ethical pluralism which holds that several moral standards may be relevant 
depending on the specific situation.  Indeed, as Bauman (1993) argues, a universal, non-
ambivalent and ‘objectively founded’ morality is a practical impossibility and there are 
complexities which characterise human and social life to which there are no ready solutions, 
but which lie in the power of individual and personal moral responsibility which require the 
‘reawakening’ of the individual moral conscience, which is largely based on impulse. 
Pluralism recognises that individuals may have many standards of value, which may not 
necessarily be consistent with one another; it views a lack of compatibility and disagreement 
as being positive in helping understanding of how to arrive at a best course of action, without 
it amounting to a relativist position. A pluralist position therefore rejects a theory of non-
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contradiction upon which typical rational logic is based, and may account for the inconsistent 
ways in which consumers may make trade-offs.  
 
In discounting both absolutist and relativist moral perspectives, this pluralist rejection of the 
philosophical position of non-contradiction and arriving at common consciousness connects 
with the philosophical school of pragmatism; as Painter-Morland and ten Bos (2011) argue, 
pragmatism can provide: “…a generic approach from which ‘a reasonable pluralism’ may be 
shown to arise.” (p41). Talisse (2012) also acknowledges the consistency between 
pragmatism and pluralism, as he notes that pragmatism is rooted in the practice of inquiry, 
and that an epistemological pluralism holds that moral knowledge is incomplete, but remains 
open to the prospect that it could be complete if further inquiry was to be undertaken. Also, 
Rorty (1984/1999) emphasises the relational aspect to values; value is assigned to things on 
the basis of their relationships to other people and things. Thus, studies need to account for 
the fluid and relational way in which trade-offs are negotiated, and to develop an alternative 
perspective on agency which goes beyond the subject as rational decision-maker making 
deliberate trade-offs. 
 
This pluralist and pragmatist ontological position and phenomenological epistemology 
requires the use of particular methods for capturing the lived experiences of the subjects of 
research. For example, Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) suggest personal narratives; stories of 
how the consumer consumes products to examine how the consumer interprets their 
consumption experiences. Likewise, Hobson (2006) notes that pragmatist theories emphasise 
experience, utilising interactionalist methods which attempt to work with everyday practices 
as they have occurred.  Working at the level of personal narratives naturally leads to 
qualitative techniques; Kvale (1996) cites Rorty’s emphasis on the constitution of knowledge 
through a conversation between people rather than each person re-presenting an objective 
world; knowing does not have an ‘essence’, and conversation is the context in which 
knowledge is understood. Twenty depth interviews were therefore conducted with ethically-
aware and motivated informants, drawn from sustainability research groups in provincial UK 
universities. The sample was purposive to include relatively committed or ‘convinced’ ethical 
consumers; those who ‘self-report’ that ethics is an important issue in clothing consumption. 
In particular, the focus on value and the concept of the trade-offs are important, which as 
previously noted is a recurrent theme in previous research but one which remains 
underdeveloped. These trade-offs from a moral sense are only likely to exist for those who 
have some moral motivation. Access was gained through identifying and approaching those 
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responsible for sustainability research to gain access to lists of members, through the 
exploitation of personal networks, and through snowballing.  
 
The purpose of the interviews was threefold. Firstly, to explore informants’ sense of morality 
as consumers, and those moral issues which are particularly important for them; to explore 
how those moral issues are embedded in values, and finally to discover how value is 
evaluated or experienced from specific purchases and to consider the wider implications for 
ethical purchasing. 
 
Adopting Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2000) ‘reflexive interpretation’, two dominant levels of 
interpretation were employed in analysis.  Rejecting dominant ‘recipe book’ methodological 
approaches, they synthesise some of the benefits of data-oriented methods (such as grounded 
theory), hermeneutics, critical theory and postmodernism, noting that postmodern sociology 
and critical phenomenology are variants of reflective / reflexive research which constantly 
assesses knowledge and the ways of doing knowledge. This necessitates giving consideration 
to the way in which different analytic and theoretical elements are woven together in the 
process of knowledge development, during which empirical material is constructed, 
interpreted and written. Thus analysis followed an abductive approach broadly consistent with 
the type identified by Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) consisting of two primary stages as 
follows: the first phase was an intertextual analysis identified by Thompson (1997), which 
seeks to determine the factors or dimensions of value highlighted as significant for this group. 
For this initial stage a coding approach was taken, both inductively and deductively against 
each of the dimensions of the ‘net value for the customer’ framework (Woodall, 2003) using 
QSR Nvivo software. The second phase of analysis sought to place this understanding of 
value in the wider context of the research, by drawing on Thompson’s (1997) hermeneutic 
model of meaning construction for interpreting consumption stories to develop an 
interpretation of why the benefits and sacrifices and their balancing are meaningful in the 
consumers’ own perspectives and personal narratives. 
 
Results 
Informants 
Twenty interviews were conducted in total with transcription and coding being undertaken as 
interviews were completed. The time expended allowed for time for ‘immersion’ in the 
transcripts to develop analysis. Each interview lasted for around one hour.  
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Each respondent was active in a sustainability-related research group at one of a number of 
Universities across the East Midlands of the United Kingdom, although the respondents were 
drawn from a wide variety of academic disciplines (some, perhaps naturally given the nature 
of sustainability issues, considered themselves to be cross-disciplinary). In line with a strategy 
of theoretical sampling, a mixture of people across different socio-demographic groups were 
included in the sample. By the twentieth interview it was apparent that ‘theoretical saturation’ 
had occurred; no new codes were emerging, further ‘weight’ was being given to the central 
themes, and central categories were becoming saturated (Strauss and Corbin, 1998); 
consequently an adequate absolute threshold had been reached, certainly in line with many 
recommendations about minimum sample sizes for qualitative interviewing (Cherrier, 2005, 
Kvale, 1996, Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 
Intertextual Analysis: Significant Dimensions of Value 
The codes that were developed and their initial relationships can be seen in figures 1 and 2. 
The first shows the codes developed under the Net VC framework, whilst the second shows 
the codes related to other dimensions which were inductively developed. 
 
Figure 1: Codes Resulting from A-Priori / Open Coding: Net Value for the Customer  
 
 
The other codes developed through the first stage of open coding can be broadly clustered 
under five themes; buying practices, context, ethical concerns, power and values. Codes 
displayed in the header row below were structured as ‘parent’ codes to those underneath.     
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Figure 2: Inductive Codes  
 
This iterative process of open and axial coding began to immediately raise theoretical 
directions and insights as natural groupings and linkages started to take shape; certainly there 
emerged elements in the ‘value equation’ in relation to key dimensions and how they impact 
purchasing decisions. Core product features were extremely significant, with style, function, 
material, durability and goods quality referenced numerous times, along with social benefits 
(and projecting self-image in particular). Price and psychological costs also appeared to be 
significant elements of value, along with effort to a slightly lesser degree.   
 
However, issues arose around some wider concerns; especially whether everything should be 
classified under the Net VC framework. Certainly there were elements of proposed benefit 
and sacrifice which were emerging under other codes; the issue of ‘self-identity’, for example, 
is a key contextual factor, but could be either benefit or sacrifice depending on how this 
‘played out’ with specific purchases. Likewise, ethical concerns could be classified as 
potential benefit if they were to be realised. Also, it was not always clear whether a factor 
should be considered a benefit or a sacrifice. For example, something which required effort 
could be seen as a sacrifice, but similarly respondents talked about convenience as a benefit 
and whilst a principle of minimisation as benefit and maximisation as sacrifice seems 
intuitively a sensible state of affairs, it highlights tensions between ‘tight’ definitions and 
categorisations.  
 
Other clear themes emerged. The notion of ‘context’ (related to the notion of personal 
narratives) including self-identity, upbringing and life changes were oft-recurring themes 
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which appear to be extremely significant, as did the categories of habit. However, it was at 
this stage of the open coding where no new codes were emerging and further weight was 
being given to those which were emerging as being significant. The next stage was therefore 
to refine these themes, with the aim of producing a hermeneutic model through which a 
deeper level of analysis could occur. The aim was not to produce a definitive central category 
and theoretical scheme, but to identify the consumption meanings conveyed by the texts as an 
aid to an intertextual process of identifying hermeneutic themes to explore patterns and 
differences across the interviews. Essentially, the codes acted as the ‘notes in the margins’ of 
the transcripts, following which the ‘part-whole’ movement was therefore continued in the 
analysis by re-reading the texts in light of the emerging issues to identify new insights. 
 
Hermeneutic Analysis of Value Meaning Construction 
 
As previously noted, Thompson’s (1997: 440-441) model of consumer meaning construction 
was used as an initial hermeneutic device. The model (see figure 3) consists of six structural  
elements which have been adapted for this context based on the coding exercise: 
 
Figure 3: A hermeneutic model of value meaning construction  (adapted from Thompson, 
1997: 440) 
 
 
 
1. Self-identity: personal history and context. A broader narrative of self-identity 
contextualises this perspective to give meaning to life events. The analysis revealed self-
identity (and its communication) to be a central thematic category, giving weight to this 
element of the model. Connected to this, values, upbringing and life changes were also 
significant themes.  
2. A cultural background of historically established meanings provide the context for these 
personal history narratives. This provides the social categories, folk knowledge and 
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interpretive frames of reference from which self-identity is constructed. Aspects of 
upbringing were relevant here, along with other cultural and social references, through 
which an overall desire to consume less as a result of financial prudence inherited from 
family was the overriding concern.  
3. Personalised cultural frames of reference include the many relational forms through 
which a consumer’s cultural background and the personal meanings they give rise to are 
constructed. Here purchasing habits are a salient category of ‘cultural capital’ which 
characterise consumer meanings and behaviour in this study. These result in… 
4. Interpreted meanings of value (consumption stories), which express a dialectical 
relationship between the social conditions mentioned above and identity issues salient to 
the consumer. These are played out through the consumption stories described in the 
interviews, and the value evaluations in which they were manifest.  
5. Experiential Gestalt: perceptions of value directly influence the interpreted meanings 
above; with the consumers’ perceptions of their experiences framing their sense-making. 
Again, the language of value characterises much of this framing.  
6. Dialogical transformations; the model positions consumers as self-narrators who 
selectively highlight particular dimensions of the consumption events they experience, the 
stories about which impose a meaningful historical order onto their life events. This is 
where the concept of value and its linking to higher order values comes into play in terms 
of the broader life narrative to which these consumption experience contribute. It is here 
that the lines between benefit and sacrifice and value and values become blurred.  
 
In relation to these final two points the analysis reveals that a complex picture emerges from 
the informants’ consumption practices, relating to a host of identity, knowledge, affective, 
cognitive and practice-based factors. In attempting to understand the multiple dimensions 
which constitute value for this group, the Net VC provided a useful framework on which to 
‘hang’ some of the salient issues, but it was also limiting in dealing with the myriad of 
concerns, habits, and identities rooted in individuals’ evaluations as a basis for practice. There 
is, indeed, limited evidence that informants take an exclusively rational, cognitive approach to 
value evaluation, although there were isolated incidents of this type of approach. Even where 
there was some rational, cognitive ‘niceness / price’ evaluation, the role of affect and 
hedonism (‘I have to have it’) was also evident. Similarly, one respondent’s ‘cost per wear’ 
calculations were also overlain by a hedonistic enjoyment of shopping. However, there are 
issues revealed by the analysis in relation to the application of the model.  
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Firstly, the distinction between benefit and sacrifice was not always so clear cut as noted 
above. Even price, which might be considered to be one of the most immutable sacrifices, 
could operate as a benefit, either in positive perceptions related to quality, or in terms of 
making ‘donations’ where positive purchasing was sometimes seen as a form of charitable 
giving. Similarly, whilst ethically produced clothes had the potential to provide benefit for the 
informants engaged in positive purchasing, questions around initiatives such as fair trade or 
problems with style and identity could be viewed as sacrifices. Similarly, in the same way 
informants’ avoidance of particular brands could be seen as sacrifice, it could also be seen as 
a personal and/or social benefit in terms of the avoidance of guilt or projecting a particular 
image to others.  
 
Secondly, there is a question of whether ‘personal benefits’ adequately account for the 
complex identities and personal histories at stake. As noted by one respondent in the 
following passage, despite a key identity issue of normally being a ‘careful’ shopper and one 
of the most-sustainability-motivated informants in the sample, sometimes there was not 
actually much ‘trading off’ in a rational, utilitarian sense to be done, but an acknowledgement 
that sometimes identity provided the greatest ‘pull’. Thirdly, what emerges is that the 
behaviours are highly context-specific, and often contradictory. This does not validate the 
existence of an ‘attitude-behaviour’ gap per se, but a complex series of rationalisations for 
engaging in particular acts. The respondent went on to say: 
 
 
 
This (stated) behaviour of reducing the amount of consumption but increasing spend is 
justified as sustainable behaviour; there is no ‘gap’ between saying or thinking ‘x’ and doing 
‘y’. Another informant adopted a similar strategy, again for a hedonic impulse purchase, 
albeit one which had its roots in a deeper personal history. Another respondent also discussed 
how she attempted to address some of her ethical concerns in buying clothes for the children, 
but in this case the dissonance that arises from purchases perceived to be less ethical is 
justified by the acknowledgement by the boycott of another retailer.   
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Fourth, some distinction could be drawn between cognitive and affective aspects of 
consumers’ decision making, with post-purchase rationalisations often lying behind more 
affective or hedonistic buying decisions. Whilst conative aspects are significant, but within 
this there are questions around whether purchases were purposive or intuitive. Informants 
described issues around trade-offs when speaking hypothetically about their attitudes, 
preferences and behaviours, but examples given of purchases in the consumption stories often 
carried much less detail. The discussion will draw on some of these consumption stories to 
illustrate. 
 
Discussion 
The role of values in relation to consumer trade-offs: endless ends, prudence and morality 
It was suggested earlier, drawing on moral norm theory that values are considered an 
important determinant of behaviour, both in relation to the achievement of ‘end states’ of 
being (Schwartz, 1994) and the value that is correspondingly not only derived from products 
and services which facilitate achievement of those end states (Gutman, 1982), but also in 
relation to their contribution to the achievement of identity goals (Arnould and Thompson, 
2005) and therefore character and virtues (Garcia-Ruiz and Rodriquez-Lluesma, 2014; Shaw 
et al., 2000). As with pluralist (Hinman, 2003) and postmodern (Bauman, 1993) perspectives, 
the interviews revealed that in discussing particular purchases different value orientations 
appeared to be important (especially values of universalism, benevolence and tradition), but 
they also interact and sometimes contradict, although the notion of values conflicts was 
infrequently expressed.  
 
Furthermore, the interviews revealed three key dimensions of values as they relate to ethical 
consumption; the historical establishment of values, the ‘ordering’ and prioritisation or 
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‘trading off’ of values, and thirdly the role of values in achieving various end states. Firstly, it 
was noted that values were often expressed as having been passed through family. As 
Grønhøj and Thøgerson (2009) find, there are significant relationships between parents and 
children across all values domains. They find this is especially true of pro-environmental 
attitudes.  Whilst this study would support the intergenerational influence of values, this was 
never explicitly expressed in terms of pro-environmental behaviours. Rather, universal values 
linked to sustainability were more often couched in a broader history of a love of the outdoors 
and nature, which often invoked ‘romanticised’ stories of childhood, or even more in security-
driven values of having been brought up in households that were careful with money, and the 
‘avoidance of waste’ was a key determinant of behaviour.  
 
Secondly, just as values do not appear to be ‘ordered’ in hierarchical form as suggested by 
Jägel et al. (2012), they neither appear to be ‘traded off’ in the sense that one value must be 
compromised in favour of another as suggested by Devinney et al. (2010) and Auger et al. 
(2003). Informants rarely spoke of value conflicts, except in relation to the very contextually-
specific utilitarian decision making at the micro-level within  narrow areas of concern. 
Indeed, there persisted a level of ease and comfort generally that each individual’s values 
were ‘upheld’ through their clothing purchases. In explaining this, it is worth turning to 
pragmatist philosophy, and in particular two dimensions of values and valuation.  
 
Firstly, in challenging the notion of an ‘ordering’ of values as espoused in much of the 
consumption literature (Jägel et al., 2012; Paul et al., 2009; Kahle and Kennedy, 1988), and 
secondly, their contribution to the achievement of a variety of ‘end states’, Rorty (1999) 
advocates the relational view of moral values, and also acknowledges the roles of parentage 
and relational family ties in developing a moral sense by what comes naturally. He argues 
that, as Dewey observed the boundaries of the self are ‘fuzzy and flexible’, and other 
philosophers deal with that ‘fuzziness’ by arguing that the boundaries are fixed by viewing 
the self as being constituted by preference rankings. Moral obligation is then contrasted with 
preferences. This notion of ‘preference ranking’ could be likened to the ordering of values 
discussed previously, whereas the pragmatist view would question the sense in a person 
acting against their own preferences, and instead recognises that the boundaries of the self are 
flexible. As Painter-Morland (2011) notes, moral development is a process of constant 
renegotiation of the self in relation to a changing network of people, relationships and things. 
Therefore, the concept of ‘trading off’, ‘balancing’ (Jagel et al., 2012) or ordering values 
becomes redundant; values are the result of relationships developed over time, and which 
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emerge, despite also having a history (Painter-Morland, 2011). Rorty’s (1999) analogy is that 
moral values development resembles the sewing together of a large, complex polychromatic 
quilt; in the context of this study, this would explain the informants’ failure to express 
complications arising from having to prioritise one moral value over another, or conflicts 
arising in purchasing from having compromised values; as the pragmatists suggest, values are 
just not seen in this way.  
 
With regard to the role of values in achieving ‘end states’ and therefore contributing to value, 
whilst the values which guide action were expressed in particular ways there was little 
evidence of their role as consistently guiding individuals to ‘absolute’ ends.  It was suggested 
previously by Devinney et al. (2010) a view of values which sees them as immutable would 
require in changing consumer behaviour ‘ a religious conversion of sorts’. However, a 
pragmatist view of values would see them as changing and changeable (Tiles, 1990), and 
whilst they are connected to ‘ends’, the ends do not subconsciously guide action; as Painter-
Morland (2011) argues, Dewey’s pragmatism allows for the construction of ends with 
individuals’ personal and contextual circumstances, similar to the reciprocal determination of 
ends which are entrenched in habits (Anderson, 2014), which are a more likely representation 
of the changing and contradictory nature of values. Similar to Schatzki’s (1997) conception of 
teleoaffectivity (the idea that actions are governed by orientations towards ends, with the 
affective dimension recognising there is no ‘single’ end), Dewey therefore refers to ‘ends in 
view’ rather than ‘absolute’ end states, but for pragmatists, means and ends are ‘reciprocally 
determined’. That is, the ‘end’ cannot be completely conceived until one understands what it 
is that one must do to arrive at it. However, aims can only become ends or aims when the 
actual conditions for their realisation have been worked out. Both of these factors (ends in 
view, and the conditions for realisation) are a natural part of an ever-shifting experience of 
value.  Thus, practical judgement is creative and transformative in continuously reshaping 
new ends. In examining this in the context of some of the consumption stories revealed in the 
study, it is necessary to consider Rorty’s (1999) explanation of Dewey’s distinction between 
prudence and morality.  
 
According to Rorty (1999), ‘prudence’ is related to concepts such as ‘habit’ and ‘custom’; 
routine behaviours which require little thought and are for the most part instinctive and action 
is guided by ‘what comes naturally’, as identified by many of the practice theorists (such as 
Hargreaves, 2011, and Warde, 2005). Morality comes into play when one is unable to do what 
comes naturally; when routine is no longer good enough. As there is no distinction between 
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what is good (teleological principles) and what is right (deontological principles); the 
distinction between prudence and morality is a question of the degree of need for conscious 
deliberation, and when these value judgements are enacted, they are tested in practice and re-
evaluated (Anderson, 2014). This appears to be at work in this study in the following ways: 
 
Firstly, purchasing behaviour was entirely driven by habit and custom; informants identified a 
relatively small ‘repertoire’ of preferred retailers which were negotiated over the years and 
engrained in custom and practice. Where the retailer ‘set’ had changed, this was often in 
response to some life change. As Appiah (2006) argues, justifications of our acts are typically 
made after what has been intuitively decided, and that intuition is a product of upbringing and 
lived experience, and engaging in justifications (or reasoning) only happens in thinking about 
change. There is convincing evidence in this study that the same is also true in consumption. 
That is, individuals are engaged in clothing consumption practices that emerge from a lifetime 
of learning, experience and identity pressures, and which changed in relation to life changes, 
whether these are ‘concrete’ (such as moving to a new country or acquiring a new job), or 
self-perceived (such as an individually-held perception that one is ‘maturing’ or physically 
changing). Thus, the retailer set frequented by the respondents was relatively stable, and only 
changed when new ‘styles’ or brand identities were required in response to life changes.  
 
These principles can be seen at work in three examples of purchases of coats; Sarah’s Barbour 
jacket, Daphne’s (attempted) purchase of a winter coat and Meryl’s coat from Marks and 
Spencer: 
 
 
Here, Meryl’s routine (prudence) is clearly at work. Her historical purchasing at Marks and 
Spencer, desire for quality (based in her own long-standing career in the clothing industry) is 
instinctive, requiring little conscious deliberation. Her values are embedded in long-standing 
and routine habit. Indeed, this characterised much of Meryl’s purchasing, along with many 
others in the sample. The act of evaluating the coat here for Meryl cannot really be 
undertaken until she knows how the coat will function as a means in the future in relation to 
specific circumstances, at which point the desired ‘ends’ may have changed and habits may 
have changed accordingly. Whether the ends sought are intrinsic or instrumental is only a 
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function of how an individual regards something at the time. (Anderson, 2014). Contrast this 
with Daphne’s search for a coat:   
 
 
Here there is a clear cognitive dimension to Daphne’s (as yet still to be undertaken) purchase. 
As Anderson (2014) explains, the appraisal of something is to judge it in relation to the means 
required to attain it, and consequently appraisal is fundamentally about means. However, as 
Daphne explains here, the cost of acquiring the thing she really wants is too high, and her 
evaluation of the brand she valued previously in relation to its perceived quality problems has 
led to her valuing it less.  She also makes a number of projections about the length of time she 
expects it to last (important in relation to her stated ethical principles), and the weather 
conditions under which the coat will be needed. Further, the purchase has led to the causation 
of arguments with her husband, so her appraisal of the jacket as a means and the relational 
dimension to this has further influenced her devaluing it as an end to the extent that she 
decides not to buy it at all. Here the procrastination could be seen as habitual, with the reasons 
for non-purchase a rationalisation of this habitual prudence, where ‘prudence’ is a routine way 
of responding to circumstance (Rorty, 1999). Further, the act of evaluating the coat here for 
Daphne cannot really be undertaken until she knows how the coat will function as a means in 
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the future in relation to specific circumstances; particular weather conditions, the actual 
durability of the coat and so on, at which point the desired ‘ends’ may have changed and her 
habits may have changed accordingly. Finally, Sarah discussed her purchase of a coat, which 
was not strictly habitual but also required less conscious deliberation, and reveals another 
dimension of this view of valuation:  
 
 
As before, Sarah’s evaluation of the coat cannot be undertaken until she enacts its use; she 
may discover they are not made in the UK, her tastes in colour may change, she may not want 
it to last forever; the job of rewaxing may become too expensive or time-consuming…  at 
which point the desired ‘ends’ may have changed and her habits may have changed 
accordingly. However, the passage above takes on a different meaning when contextualised 
against something Sarah revealed later in the interview: 
 
 
This further passage reveals the roles of both routinised behaviour (shopping in John Lewis), 
the roles of relational others and history in shaping the self (‘them’ in Wales) and the 
justification of the stated values to be enacted (made in the UK, last a lifetime, looks good) 
after the fact.  
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Thus, as Dewey (In Anderson, 2014) suggests, ethical evaluation is not against the ‘end’ or 
some supreme principle as in much of the means-end perpsectives (Jägel et al., 2012; 
Gutman, 1982), but in identifying a method for improving or explaining value judgements, 
especially when actions seem ‘out of place’ or are questioned. Seeing the role of values in 
driving ethical consumption in this way reveals it to be less of case of having a particular state 
of being as an end goal or a ‘thing’ with a set of associated principles which drive behaviour 
which is then evaluated as ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’. Instead, as Giddens (1991) has 
argued in relation to identity, it should be seen as a ‘life project’ which can be seen in the 
justification of habits and constantly re-evaluated, renegotiated and rehabitualised as 
individuals engage in practice.  
 
Everything flows: value evaluations and consummatory experience 
It was argued earlier that the overall perception of value is more likely to be represented by an 
aggregation (Woodall, 2003), deriving from and governing practices based on tacit 
knowledge and lacking in conscious reflection (Helkkula et al., 2012), and delivering 
phenomenological value (Ng and Smith, 2012). This aggregate perspective of value 
(suggested as a form of ‘personal advantage’) takes into account all of the factors relevant at 
any particular time. In doing so, it draws on the past and sees ahead into the future and 
recognises the balance of benefits and sacrifices (whether cognitive, affective or intuitive), 
and which may occur at different levels of action, practice and experience. This perspective 
recognises the phenomenological and plural perspectives, the subjectivity of the consumer 
and the fluid nature of value enacted in practice (Dewey, in Gouinlock, 1994).  
 
The analysis supports this plural and fluid nature of value, and it was highlighted that 
although there is evidence of utilitarian and cognitive decision-making at the micro-level, the 
notion of a trade-off is perhaps more fluid and ambiguous than a clearly demarcated set of 
benefits and sacrifices. Additionally, valuation tends to be more subconscious or intuitive 
ante-post, with justifications made for behaviours ex-post. However, there is no ‘absolute 
truth’ in the form of a value to be realised. In searching for an explanation of the factors that 
are at play in this phenomenon, it is worth revisiting the pragmatist responses discussed 
earlier in relation to Rorty’s (1999) perspectives on truth and justification.  
 
As Rorty (1999) argues there is no connection between justification and truth; any member of 
a community will be able to provide a justification of his or her beliefs to that community, but 
it does not mean that the beliefs he or she is best able to justify are those that are ‘true’, nor 
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least able to justify those that are false. Justification and inquiry are activities people engage 
in, but there does not need to be a goal of ‘truth’;  beliefs are set by subjective 
phenomenological motivations: “…the only point in contrasting the true with the merely 
justified is to contrast a possible future with the actual present.” (Rorty, 1999: 38-39). 
Likewise, there is no objective standard of a ‘good’ ethical consumption expressed by these 
informants, nor, indeed is there any agreement on what this might look like. Even those things 
which are often treated as ‘objective’ ethical standards such as organic and fair trade were 
called into question as part of justifications for their absence in consumption patterns, nor is it 
likely that any members of a community would be able to agree on what an ideal level of 
consumption would be, despite the attempts by the majority of the informants to reduce their 
own. This process of justification may then involve the critical reworking and co-creation of 
commercial meanings to serve an individual’s identity goals (Thompson et al., 2013).  
 
Similarly, there is no best ‘value’ to which such ethical concerns might contribute. The 
myriad of identity concerns, values, habits, benefits, sacrifices and the ‘fuzziness’ between 
them appears to be aggregated into an overall sense of ‘personal advantage’ which is 
developed over time as a result of lived experience and entrenched in habits, for which 
justification is then offered (to oneself or the community with which one is engaged) after the 
fact. Indeed, as Luedicke et al. (2010: 1030) argue, moral narratives can be employed to 
justify particular status distinctions, regardless of the perceived ‘authenticity’ of the moral 
claim. However, the resulting experience, as with the notion of an aggregate value, can also 
be identified within pragmatist thought. As defined by Dewey, these types of experience are 
consummatory’; they possess a concluding unity which: “…possesses a single quality that 
pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts.” (Dewey, in 
Gouinlock, 1994: 76). This unity is expressed in the name given to experiences, or in this 
case, purchases: ‘that’ meal; ‘that’ coat, and it is not emotional, cognitive or behavioural, for 
these labels separate distinctions of elements within the experience that do not capture its 
unity. However: “In going over an experience in mind after its occurrence, we may find that 
one property rather than another was sufficiently dominant so that it characterises the 
experience as a whole.” (Ibid).  
 
Woodall (2003) further asks the question of how, in a hypothetical consumption situation, an 
individual would reflect ex-post upon the experience, and which aspect of value would 
dominate; the evidence presented here is in accordance with Woodall’s proposal for an 
aggregate form of value for the customer (expressed rationally or intuitively), which also 
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takes into account past experiences. Woodall represents this as a Rubik’s cube, with the 
positions of the different colours (forms of value) around the cube representing their 
importance in different time frames. This corresponds well with Rorty’s (1999) conception of 
the polychrome quilt discussed earlier, and the notion of moral choice being about ‘competing 
goods’ (rather than an objective ‘right’ and ‘wrong’). Within this, it is proposed that benefits 
and sacrifices are seen as not opposing ends of a continuum or equation, but in a way that 
they cannot be seen as being independent from each other, borrowing from Quantum Theory, 
they are ‘entangled’. That is, the dimension can be seen as both benefit or sacrifice, depending 
on who is undertaking the evaluation and when.  
 
However, a Rubik’s cube can be manipulated in a sequence to arrive at a definite answer, and 
although a polychrome quilt can be enlarged and continuously added to, once it is sewn it 
becomes a fixed object. Due to the ‘fuzziness’, fluidity and pluralistic and overlapping nature 
of the dimensions that make up the cube or quilt, and the ‘entanglement’ of benefit and 
sacrifice, the is best represented as a series of overlapping shapes which in its totality at any 
particular moment in time represents a form of ‘aggregated personal advantage’ which exists 
as a justification of behaviour and which can be called into question in considering change. 
As Bourdieu (1992) argues, thoughts and actions are governed by a small number of 
‘generative principles’ which are polysemic; both closely interrelated and constituted into a 
practically-oriented whole which is dichotomously characterised not only by a coherence, but 
also a ‘fuzziness’. To this, the notion of fluidity and constantly shifting priorities and 
influencing factors could be added. Thus, value would not resemble a static diagram, but a 
series of constantly shifting and morphing shapes as in a psychedelic animation or a lava 
lamp.  Lava lamps are characterised by a series of rising and sinking ‘globules’, or shapes, 
which give an effect of continuously shifting patterns. Each shape in the lava lamp represents 
the different forms and dimensions of value derived, with the relative size demonstrating their 
relative importance. There is no distinction between benefit and sacrifice, although both of 
those notions exist. Likewise, there is no distinction between ‘moral’ value and overall value; 
they are inherently morphed together and from each other and synchronous within the overall 
decision. A price which represents ‘good value’ should not be seen as a sacrifice, for example. 
Likewise, if the working conditions of the factory workers who made the garment are 
important, this would be included as a part of the formation inside the lamp, the size of the 
‘bubble’ conveying its importance if ex-ante, or its evaluation ex-post. The lava inside the 
lamp would continuously shift, acknowledging the emergence of ‘endless ends’, and 
reflecting the myriad of concerns and issues. 
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This study therefore adds two further dimensions to the debate on ethical consumption. Firstly 
it is argued that value is an appropriate means to explain the ‘trade-offs’ that are claimed to 
exist in ethical consumption. Secondly, rather than conceptualising these trade-offs as much 
of the literature suggests as rational, cognitive and utilitarian evaluations, it is suggested they 
emerge in practice as a form of aggregate personal advantage or consummation which, 
significantly, is framed largely as justification after the fact. Value and ethics as a dimension 
of it cannot be seen in cause and effect relationships or cognitive trade-offs; rather, a 
pragmatist reading highlights the complexity of the emergence of aggregate value, with its 
influences in personal histories, habituation and, to some degree, peer pressure which push 
individuals towards ends in view. The notion of an ‘emergent moral value for the individual’ 
is perhaps what characterises this best.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This group of consumers are not involved in deliberative rational trade-offs in the pursuit of a 
limited set of values, nor is ethical consumption a ‘myth’ as suggested at the beginning of this 
paper. Rather, constantly morphing practices and life stories are evident, which contain within 
them complex, but repetitive patterns of preferences, morals, values, desires, identities and 
relationships which change in response to life changes and ‘ends in view’. These can be 
likened to Rorty’s (1999) conception of values as a polychrome quilt, although the 
‘psychedelic’ effect within a lava lamp perhaps better represents Bourdieu’s (1992) 
conception of a number of dimensions evident here which are polysemic; both closely 
interrelated and constituted into a practically-oriented whole which is characterised by both a 
coherence and a ‘fuzziness’, and also overlain by a fluidity. 
 
In terms of the act of valuation, the study finds that perception of value is represented by an 
overall form of aggregate personal advantage, which lacks conscious reflection and delivers a 
phenomenological form of value rooted in habits; this characterisation reflects Dewey’s 
representation of unified value as ‘consummatory experience’; “…a single quality that 
pervades entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts.” (Dewey, in 
Gouinlock, 1994: 76). This takes place in the context of ends in view which emerge through 
experience. These relationships can be seen in figure 4, in which fluid forms of value exist 
within the ‘consummation’, which emerge as individuals practice habitual behaviours pulled 
towards ends in view which are shaped by identity, and as a result of which habits may 
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change as individuals engage in arriving at value judgements or in response to new ends in 
view. The cycle is then repeated as individuals engage in practice, call value judgements into 
question (in response to evaluations of value, in response to life changes or in justifying 
beliefs to audiences) and reengage in practice.  
 
Figure 4: Consumption as consummatory experience 
 
This study therefore employs pragmatist thinking to move the discussion around ethical 
consumption on from a negatively framed narrative of trading-off, sacrificing and inefficiency 
which subscribes to a scientific epistemology of non-contradiction, to one of practicing, 
prioritising competing goods, and justifying behaviours. In doing so, it recognises the 
postmodern and relativist nature of the moral and consumer context, whilst addressing the 
problems for action associated with it. Its central contribution is to frame the role of morality 
in consumption as consummatory experience; a unification of value that takes place in the 
context of an end in view, and which continuously merges flows of experiences and 
habituation. 
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